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U.S. Prisons and Racial Profiling: A
Covertly Racist Nation Rides a Vicious
Cycle
DJ Silton*

Introduction
"There are more [B]lack people in prisons and jails than in
colleges and universities. The term 'institutionalized racism' is
not too harsh a term for this statistic."' Although provocative,
Judge C. Victor Lander's comment accurately describes one of the
United States' worst ills. Winston Churchill opined that one could
judge a society by looking at its prisons. 2 By that reasoning, a
society must address its criminal justice system as part of solving
its problems. Currently, the U.S. criminal justice system is doing

* J.D. expected 2002, University of Minnesota. B.A. 1998, University of Michigan.
For their comments on earlier drafts of this article, I would like to thank Benjamin
I would also like to thank
Fetcher, Angela Hall, and Rumna Chowdhury.
professors john powell and Gerard Fergerson for their comments and their work in
educating the community at large on the prevalence of racial discrimination in this
country.
The writing of this article commenced prior to the tragic events of Sept. 11,
2001. The ultimate results of those events have yet to become clear, but I am
certain that they will significantly influence the discussion of this topic in the

future.
1. Hon. C. Victor Lander, Racism in the Criminal Justice System, 2 ANN. 2000
ATLA-CLE 1801 (2000).
2. Sir Leon Radzinowicz & Roger Hood, Judicial Discretion and Sentencing
Standards: Victorian Attempts to Solve a Perennial Problem, 127 U. PA. L. REV.
1288, 1348-49 (1979) (quoting Winston Churchill, Home Office Supply (Report), 19
PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th Ser.) (1910) 1343, 1354).
The mood and temper of the public in regard to the treatment of crime and
criminals is one of the most unfailing tests of the civilisation of any
country. A calm and dispassionate recognition of the rights of the accused
against the State, and even of convicted criminals against the State, a
constant heart-searching by all charged with the duty of punishment, a
desire and eagerness to rehabilitate in the world of industry all those who
have paid their dues in the hard coinage of punishment, tireless efforts
towards the discovery of curative and regenerating processes, and an
unfaltering faith that there is a treasure, if you can only find it, in the
heart of every man-these are the symbols which in the treatment of crime
and criminals mark and measure the stored-up strength of a nation, and
are the sign and proof of the living virtue in it.
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more harm than good with respect to racism.
In 1970, the U.S. federal and state prison systems confined
200,000 prisoners. 3 Today, the U.S. prison population totals more
than 2,000,000. 4 While sources assign various reasons for the
prison increase, longer sentencing and a higher rate of recidivism
are the main factors. 5 This increase has also been attributed to
the United States' War on Drugs. 6 These reasons are not mutually
exclusive. Along with other causes, they exist symbiotically,
7
resulting in significant racial disparity in prisons.
Instead of responding to the rising prison population by
questioning the severity of criminal penalties, the political
atmosphere has been dominated by an enforcement-hungry policy
discourse that ignores the roots of the problem.8 This strong
political pressure affects all branches of government, encouraging
executive, legislative, and judicial officials to fly the banner of
tough law enforcement. 9
While some segments of society may benefit from this prison
boom, 10 its effect on African Americans is devastating: while
making up only approximately 12% of the U.S. population, African
Americans constitute 49% of its inmates." The War on Drugs, in
addition to contributing to the prison explosion, further

3. Noel C. Richardson, Is There a Current Incarceration Crisis in the Black
Community? An Analysis of the Link Between Confinement, Capital,and Racism in
the United States, 23 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 183, 211 (1997)
(comparing the 200,000 U.S. prison population figure in 1970 to the 1,053,000
figure in 1994).
4. David Cole, See No Evil, HearNo Evil, THE NATION, Oct. 9, 2000, at 30.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See infra notes 236-243 and accompanying text.
8. See Lisa Walter, EradicatingRacial Stereotyping From Terry Stops: The
Case for an Equal Protection Exclusionary Rule, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 255, 258-59
(2000) C'[G]overnment officials have reaped political payoffs in the past two decades
for being tough on crime.").
9. See id. at 258-59, 271 (explaining the political motivation for each branch to
be tough on crime). For example, Judge Baer of the District Court for the Southern
District of New York switched from finding that probable cause did not exist under
the totality of the circumstances in a search and seizure case to finding that
probable cause did exist apparently as a result of political pressure from the New
York Mayor, Governor, and United States Congressmen. See id. at 271.
10. This boom may specifically benefit those employed by the prison industry
and Whites afraid of racial minorities. See id. at 258-59.
11. HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 2000:
EVENTS OF 1999, at 393 (2000); see also Chris Weaver & Will Purcell, The Prison
IndustrialComplex A Modern Justificationfor African Enslavement?, 41 HOW. L.J.
349, 350 (1998) (reporting that African-American men, while only 5% of the U.S.
population, make up 50% of the prison inmates).
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perpetuates this lopsided demographic. 12 Inextricably linked with
the War on Drugs, racial profiling is a vehicle for propagating
racial disparity in prisons. 13 In an effort to fight this War, our
nation has focused its attack on inner cities, and consequently, a
disproportionate number of African Americans. 14 Because African
15
Americans constitute only thirteen percent of U.S. drug users,
this battle is in effect a War on Blacks. The result: drug use is
just as prevalent as before, 16 drug-related incarcerations are up
eleven-fold, 17 and African Americans constitute the overwhelming
majority of these drug-related incarcerations.' 8
In spite of its prevalence throughout history, racial profiling
has only recently come to the attention of the U.S. general public. 19
As a result of its newfound notoriety, racial profiling has become
as important a political topic as strict law enforcement. 20 During
the second of the three 2000 presidential debates, Vice President
Al Gore promised that if elected, his first act as President would be
to issue an executive order banning racial profiling. 21 ThenGovernor George W. Bush responded that he did not want to
"federalize" the local police, but he did agree that something
22
needed to be done about racial profiling.
That "something needs to be done" grossly understates the
urgent need for drastic reform in this country's law enforcement,
Racial profiling and racial
legislative, and judicial systems.
disparity in prisons are self-perpetuating problems that require
practical solutions stronger than the present protections available

12. See infra Part II.B.
13. See Kathryn Russell, "Driving While Black"' Corollary Phenomena and
Collateral Consequences, 40 B.C. L. REV. 717, 725 (1999).
14. See Walter, supra note 8, at 258; see also infra notes 66-75 and
accompanying text (illustrating that African Americans are arrested and
incarcerated for drug use disproportionately to drug use in their class).
15. See Ira Glasser, American Drug Laws: The New Jim Crow, 1999 Edward C.
Sobota Lecture (Sept. 23, 1999), in 63 ALB. L. REV. 703, 719 (2000) (citing U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 14 (1999)).

16. See Ralph Thomas, Redrawing the Battle Lines in a Failed' War on Drugs,
SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 15, 2001, at Al.
17. See infra note 69.
18. See infra note 70 and accompanying text.
19. See David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why "Driving
While Black"Matters,84 MINN. L. REV. 265, 276 (1999).
20. See Wesley MacNeil Oliver, With an Evil Eye and an Unequal Hand.
Pretextual Stops and Doctrinal Remedies to Racial Profiling,74 TUL. L. REV. 1409,
1410 nn.1-4 (2000).
21. See Richard L. Berke, This Time, More Accord Than Discord, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 12, 2000, at Al.
22. Id.
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under the Constitution and civil rights legislation, which combat
primarily manifest racism. 23 Legislation must be designed to
attack the covert or "unconscious" racism that fuels and fosters
racial profiling and racial disparity in prisons.
Recently, President George W. Bush once again addressed
racial profiling: in describing his budget, President Bush asserted
that Attorney General John Ashcroft would spearhead the effort to
solve the problem. 24 Regardless of his pledge, Bush called racial
profiling the "abuses of a few," and asserted that he would not
"hinder the work of our nation's brave police officers."25 President
Bush, in focusing his blame on a discrete number of police officers,
overlooked a number of systemic factors, such as racist drug law
enforcement policies and misdirected sentencing guidelines, that
26
must be addressed to remedy racial profiling.
Part I of this Article introduces Gunnar Myrdal's description
of cumulative causation, a phenomenon that provides an
explanation for both the occurrence of racial disparity in prisons
and its permanency in U.S. society. 27 Part II examines different
definitions of racial profiling as well as its relation to sentencing
Part III addresses the
guidelines and the War on Drugs. 28
ineffectiveness of the Fourth Amendment, the Fourteenth
Amendment, and the various Civil Rights Acts; isolates 42 U.S.C.
§ 14141, a recent act that has been relatively valuable; and
discusses various state acts and pending bills designed to combat
racial profiling. 29 Part IV examines the inefficiencies of the
current solutions for racial profiling, while providing practical
30
solutions for a problem that has become drowned in theory.
This Article argues for a practical evolution of U.S. civil
rights legislation, a stronger and more extensive version of modern
data collection acts, and a radical reformation of sentencing
guidelines. Civil rights legislation must become a practical tool
and attack effectively racist policies that result in racial profiling.
States need standardized federal data collection laws to be

23. See infra notes 141-144, 153-161 and accompanying text (discussing the
crippling effect that the "invidious intent' requirement has on proving racist law
enforcement).
24. See Transcript of President Bush's Message to Congress on His Budget
Proposal,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2001, at A12.
25. Id.
26. See infra Part II.B-C.
27. See infra notes 31-46 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 47-105 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 106-233 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 234-291 and accompanying text.
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Finally,
implemented in order to use them as templates.
problem
incarceration
of
the
end
back
sentencing guidelines-the
that stems from racial profiling and the War on Drugs-should be
altered to address the realities of law enforcement and society in
general. These solutions share the common goal of isolating and
attacking causes for the inequitable racial balance of our prison
population.
I.

The Vicious Cycle of Cumulative Causation

Gunnar Myrdal developed the theory of Cumulative
Causation, also called the "vicious circle," in the 1940s. 31 Myrdal
asserted that the harmful effects of White prejudice are actually
contributing causes of White prejudice; that low standards of
living, poor health, and insufficient education among AfricanAmerican populations lend credibility to the concept of Black
32
inferiority, thereby creating a vicious, self-reinforcing cycle.
Myrdal explained that if either factor in the vicious cycle would
change-White prejudice or Black poverty-the cycle would reverse
itself and slowly progress to an equilibrium in which AfricanAmerican standards of living would rise while White prejudice
33
would decrease.
Many White Americans believe that the United States
approached this equilibrium with the passage of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. 34 Currently, our country's laws directly address36active
35
prejudice in areas ranging from education to employment.
racial
shifting
the
laws,
these
Notwithstanding
representation in prisons over the last few decades indicates that
racism still thrives in the United States. Between 1970 and 1984,
prisons had an incoming inmate population of 40% African
Americans and 60% Caucasians. 37 By 1991, that figure had

31. 1 GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND

MODERN DEMOCRACY 75 (Transaction Publishers 1996) (1944).
32. See id.
33. See id. at 76. Myrdal also warned that this cycle could spin downward. See

id.
34. See Maurice E. R. Munroe, Unamerican Tail: Of Segregation and
MulticulturalEducation, 64 ALB. L. REV. 241, 256 (2000).
35. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994).
36. See id. § 2000e.
37. Drug Mandatory Minimums: Are They Working? Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources of the House
Comm. on Gov't Reform, 106th Cong. 150 (2000) (prepared testimony of Wade
Henderson, Executive Director of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights)
[hereinafter Hearing].
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almost completely reversed. 38 Assuming, as many do, that racism
in the United States is on the decline, 39 this trend towards greater
African-American representation in prisons collides with Myrdal's
Cumulative Causation theory.
The theory of "unconscious racism" provides an explanation
for this paradox. 40 Unconscious racism is the residual ingrained
racism of a society that has, for the majority of its existence, been
Since society has only recently
dominated by overt racism.41
broken free from the formal bonds of intentional racism, the
notion that racial prejudice in the United States has actually been
eradicated is absurd and potentially dangerous. 42 Unconscious
racism has become the dominant form of racism in the United
States. 43 It is particularly dangerous, not only because it has
escaped the reach of the statutory and constitutional protections,
such as Fourteenth Amendment, 44 but also because it is by
definition unknown. 45 Although its effects may be blatant,
unconscious racism's surreptitiousness makes it difficult to
Our drug laws and racial profiling reflect our
isolate. 46
unconscious racism.
II. Racial Profiling
One manifestation of both overtly and covertly racist law
enforcement is the disproportionate number of African Americans
arrested and incarcerated in the United States. 47 Policy makers
and government officials have all contributed to a long list of
definitions of racial profiling. 48 While racial profiling primarily
38. Id. The 1991 figures were 54% incoming African Americans and 42%
incoming Caucasians. Id.
39. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Equality Practice: Liberal Reflections on
the Jurisprudenceof Civil Unions, 64 ALB. L. REV. 853, 868-69 (2001).
40. Another explanation is that Myrdal's theory is wrong. However, this article
assumes that his theory, which explains that a higher standard of living leads to
greater respect that in turn leads to a higher standard of living, is correct.
41. See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with UnconsciousRacism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322 (1987).
42. See id. at 363 (explaining that racism has not disappeared, but instead
transformed with the advent of the civil rights legislation).
43. See generally id. at 339-44 (discussing the prevalence of unconscious racism
in everyday life).
44. See infra Part III.B.
45. See Lawrence, supra note 41, at 322 (stating that people are unaware of
their racism).
46. See id. at 356-58.
47. See Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Racial Diversity on the Bench: Beyond Role Model and
Public Confidence, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 405, 426 (2000).
48. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (defining racial
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59

implies police actions that disproportionately target African
Americans, 49 the same effects are evident particularly in drug laws
and sentencing guidelines. 50 Although most states have been slow
in reacting to racial profiling within their borders, 51 its occurrence
52
throughout the country is painfully obvious.
A. On the Road
An appropriate definition for racial profiling in law
enforcement is not the frequently used "practice of stopping
drivers strictly on the basis of race," 53 but rather, the practice of
"police routinely [using] race as a negative signal that, along with
an accumulation of other signals, causes an officer to react with
suspicion." 54 Racial profiling by law enforcement officials occurs
not only in the typical "Driving While Black" scenario, but also
when walking while Black, standing while Black, or doing
55
practically anything while Black.
Modern studies have unearthed data that exhibit barefaced
racial profiling in traffic stops. 56 In the late 1980s and early
1990s, Dr. John Lamberth of Temple University conducted a study
to record the proportion of African-American drivers and

profiling as "selective enforcement of the law based on considerations such as
race."); Oliver, supra note 20, at 1411 ("Racial profiling [is the] use of race as a
factor in determining which offender to prosecute."); Eric Lacy, Report Examines
Racial Profiling,THE STATE NEWS VIA U-WIRE, Aug. 7, 2000, at 1 ('Racial profiling
is defined by the Michigan State Police as 'any action taken by a police officer prior
to or during a traffic stop that is based upon racial or ethnic stereotypes and that
has the effect of treating minority motorists differently than non-minority
motorists."').
49. See supranote 48, infra notes 54, 71-75 and accompanying text.
50. See infra Part I.B-C.
51. Even during a political campaign where both presidential candidates vowed
to do something about the prevalent evil of racial profiling, see supra notes 20-22
and accompanying text, most states are unwilling to deal unequivocally with the
problem. See infra notes 207-213 and accompanying text (explaining that only nine
states have passed data collection acts to monitor racial profiling, and that most of
these acts have serious drawbacks).
52. For example, African Americans constitute 13% of U.S. drug users while
making up 37% of those arrested on drug charges. THE INSTITUTE ON RACE AND
POVERTY, RACIAL PROFILING DATA COLLECTION STATUS REPORT 3 (2000)
[hereinafter INST. ON RACE AND POVERTY].
53. David Shaffer & Heron Marquez Estrada, St. Paul Police Search Black,
Hispanic Drivers at HigherRate, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, Minn.), Jan. 10, 2001, at
Al.
54. Sean P. Trende, Why Modest Proposals Offer the Best Solution for
Combating Racial Profiling, 50 DUKE L.J. 331, 333 n.13 (2000) (citing Randal
Kennedy, Suspect Policy, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 13-20, 1999, at 35).
55. See Russell, supra note 13, at 721-25.
56. See Harris, supra note 19, at 277-81.
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passengers that were pulled over on the New Jersey Turnpike
57
relative to their actual numerical representation on the road.
Dr. Lamberth used random patrol activity logs and police radio
logs, in conjunction with his own direct-observation, turnpikepopulation census. 58 Thirty-five percent of the cars pulled over
had a black driver or passenger, while only thirteen percent of cars
on the highway contained either a Black passenger or driver. 59
Similar data collection studies have emerged in various
states throughout the country, with some producing results
similar Lamberth's. For example, a report issued by the Michigan
State Police observed that while African Americans make up only
14% of the Michigan population, 60 African Americans constitute
26% of drivers subject to probable cause searches. 61 Accompanied
by evidence demonstrating that both African Americans and White
Americans violate traffic laws at the same rate, 62 the above
statistics represent clear proof of racial profiling.
B. In U.S. Drug Laws and Enforcement
Closely linked with police enforcement, drug laws themselves
represent another instance of racial profiling resulting in the
prosecution of a disproportionate number of African Americans. 63
Severity of punishment generally correlates with severity of the
crime committed; however, the punishments for cocaine-related
crimes do not follow this paradigm. Both the federal sentencing
guidelines and a growing minority of state sentencing guidelines
dispense more severe punishments for use of crack cocaine, a drug
used predominantly by African Americans, than for powder
cocaine, a drug used predominantly by White Americans. 64
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. Id.
Seventy-three percent of those stopped and arrested were African
American. Id.
60. JESSE MCKINNON, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE BLACK POPULATION: 2000,

CENSUS
2000
BRIEF
4
(2000),
available
at
http://www.census.gov/prod/200lpubs/c2kbrOl-5.pdf (last visited Nov. 28, 2001).
61. Lacy, supra note 48, at 1; see also Paul Hampel, Profiling Study Bolsters
Blacks' Charges, ST. LouIs POST-DISPATCH, June 2, 2001, at Al (citing new study
results, illustrating that Black drivers were involved in traffic stops 30% more than
Whites and were searched 70% more often).
62. See Harris, supra note 19, at 278-79.
63. See supra note 48 (providing a range of definitions of racial profiling, most
broadly allowing for the general targeting of African Americans in the criminal
justice system).
64. See Richardson, supra note 3, at 212-13; see also Dan Haude, Ohio's New
Sentencing Guidelines: A "Middleground"Approach to Crack Sentencing, 29 AKRON
L. REv. 607, 617-20 (1996) (cataloging state sentencing provisions for powder and
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The racial imbalance in prosecution resulting from the
crack/powder disparity represents only one specific example of the
Drug law
racial profiling embedded in the War on Drugs.
enforcement statistics illustrate the targeting of African
Americans even more succinctly than inequity in prosecution.
Since the United States declared its War on Drugs in the early
1980s, African Americans have been incarcerated for nonviolent
drug crimes much more often than Caucasians. 65 Between 1976
and 1989 the total number of drug arrests of Caucasians grew by
66
70%, compared to a 450% increase among African Americans.
Furthermore, between 1986 and 1991, the number of Caucasians
incarcerated for drug offenses increased by only 50%, whereas the
number of African-American inmates incarcerated for drug
offenses increased 350%.67 These disproportionate increases are
accompanied by a rapid rise in incarceration for nonviolent drug
use. Notwithstanding the fact that violent criminals make up
more than half of the nation's prison population, 68 the rate at
which drug offenders fill prisons has risen more than ten times
69
faster than that of violent offenders in the last two decades.
African Americans constitute approximately 13% of the U.S.
population and 13% of its drug users; however, African Americans
constitute 35% of drug arrests, 55% of drug convictions, and 74%
of drug imprisonments. 70 These results indicate that through the
enforcement and prosecution of the drug laws, the United States
is, in effect, waging a War on Blacks.
This occurs in part because law enforcement policies single
out certain neighborhoods as "high-drug areas" 7' or "high-crime
crack cocaine offenses).
65. See Doris Marie Provine, Too Many Black Men: The Sentencing Judge's
Dilemma, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 823, 824-25 (1998). But see Richard S. Frase,
The Uncertain Future of Sentencing Guidelines, 12 LAw & INEQ. 1, 34 (1993)
(arguing that sentencing guidelines in Minnesota have successfully counteracted
racial prejudice in the judicial system).
66. Provine, supra note 65, at 825.
67. Id.
68. See Fox Butterfield, Number in Prison Grows Despite Crime Reduction,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2000, at A10.
69. See Crispin Hull, Rough Justice for All, THE CANBERRA TIMES, Aug. 26,
2000, at P3 ('Between 1980 and 1997 the number of people entering jail [in the
United States] for violent offences less than doubled (up 82 per cent). The number
jailed for non-violent offences (tripled] (up 207 per cent) and the number jailed for
drug offences went up 11-fold (1040 per cent).").
70. Glasser, supra note 15, at 719 (citing U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 14 (1999) (estimating the 1998 African-American
population as 34,431,000 or, 12.7% of the general population)).
71. L. Darnell Weeden, It Is Not Right Under the Constitution to Stop and Frisk
Minority People Because They Don't Look Right, 21 U. ARK. LIArTLE ROCK L. REV
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areas."7 2 These neighborhoods are typically poor, in the inner city,
and contain large minority populations. 73 One reason that police
officers focus on the inner city is that it is easier for them to make
drug arrests there than in more stable and affluent
neighborhoods.7 4 Police officers in a number of departments across
the country enforce a zero tolerance policy in these "high-crime
areas," becoming ultra-sensitive to the behavior of the inhabitants,
stopping and arresting them for the slightest indication of
75
suspicious activity.
By this reasoning, people living in a "high-crime area" should
76
benefit from enhanced police enforcement in their neighborhoods.
Indeed, many inner-city inhabitants do desire greater levels of law
enforcement. 77 However, in addition to protecting innocent innercity dwellers from violence, concentrated patrolling in "high-crime
areas" also unfairly subjects these same people to police
harassment, contributes to their overall distrust of the police,
provides police officers an excuse for racially disparate arrest
rates, and consequently contributes to existing racist stereotypes
that African Americans are more apt to commit crimes. 78 As
comedian-turned-organizer Randy Credico explains: "Everyone's
hurt by this war on drugs .... People get pulled over without
probable cause on the highways. Cops go into their houses and
check around. I'm more frightened by the police than the guy
79
selling drugs on my block."
C. In Sentencing Guidelines
The disproportionate number of African Americans in prisons
is the result of racial targeting, but is as much the result of the

829, 837 (1999).
72. Id. at 840.
73. See id. at 837.
74. See Hearing,supra note 37, at 151.
75. See Weeden, supra note 71, at 837-38.
76. See Carl J. Schifferle, After Whren v. United States: Applying the Equal
Protection Clause to Racially DiscriminatoryEnforcement of the Law, 2 MICH. L. &
POL'Y REV. 159, 182 (1997).
77. See Richard R. W. Brooks, Fear and Fairness in the City: Criminal
Enforcement and Perceptions of Fairnessin Minority Communities, 73 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1219, 1221-22 (2000).
78. See Schifferle, supra note 76, at 182-83; see also Brooks, supra note 77, at
1221-22 (describing the paradox involving African Americans in high-crime areas
who desire more law enforcement yet distrust police officers).
79. Nancy Dunne, Dope Wars: Finding an Alternative to Prison, FINANCIAL
TIMES (London), Apr. 11, 2000, at World News 8 (interviewing Credico).
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In 1984,
sentencing guidelines as of police enforcement. 80
Congress passed the United States Sentencing Reform Act,8 1
allowing for the promulgation of sentencing guidelines created by
the United States Sentencing Commission. 82 The Sentencing
Reform Act was enacted to combat unpredictability, encourage
The
honesty, and create proportionality in sentencing. 83
guidelines were a response to an overall societal desire for harsher
sentences8 4 through which Congress hoped to attain greater parity
in sentencing. 85 Notwithstanding its original purpose, states now
use sentencing guidelines to handle more efficiently their
ballooning prison populations.8 6 Although sentencing guidelines
are intended to neutralize the aspects of judicial discretion that
are responsible for inequitable sentencing, the guidelines have
87
arguably worsened the problem they purported to solve.
In 1988, Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act,88 which
served as the basis for the oft-maligned 100:1 ratio. The Act
provided the same punishment for possession of five kilograms of
powder cocaine, a drug used predominantly by White Americans,
and five grams of crack cocaine, a drug used predominantly by
African Americans.8 9 Bolstered mostly by a media campaign
unreasonably vilifying crack cocaine while ignoring powder
cocaine,9 0 crack's stigma has led most states to uphold these
80. See Samuel L. Myers, Jr., Racial Disparitiesin Sentencing: Can Sentencing
Reforms Reduce Discriminationin Punishment?, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 781, 781-82
(1994) (linking racial disparities in punishment to conflicting objectives of efficiency
and fairness in sentencing and imprisonment).
81. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3656 (1994 & Supp. V
1999).
82. See Todd E. Witten, Sentence Entrapment and Manipulation:Government
Manipulation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 29 AKRON L. REV. 697, 697
(1996).
83. See 18 U.S.S.G. Ch. 1, Pt.A, intro, comment. (1996).
84. See Witten, supra note 82, at 697.
85. See Letter from William W. Wilkins, Jr., Chair, Committee on Criminal
Law, to Judge Diana E. Murphy, Chair, United States Sentencing Commission
(Mar. 10, 2000), 12 FED. SENT. R. 144 (1999) (citing S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 52
(1983)).
86. See Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Principles in Theory and Practice, 22
CRIME & JUST. 363, 430 (1997).
87. See Provine, supra note 65, at 824-25. But see Frase, supra note 65, at 34
(arguing that sentencing guidelines in Minnesota have successfully counteracted
racial prejudice in the judicial system).
88. 21 U.S.C. § 844 (1994).
89. See Richardson, supra note 3, at 213-14.
90. See United States v. Clary, 846 F.Supp. 768, 784 (E.D. Mo. 1994) (referring
to the media hysteria over crack as irrational and arbitrary); see also Erik Grant
Luna, Our Vietnam: The Prohibition Apocalypse, 46 DEPAuL L. REV. 483, 553
(1997) (citing The Federal Drugstore:Interview with Michael S. Gazzaniga, NAT'L
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effectively racist guidelines. 91 The disproportionate number of
African Americans sentenced to long prison terms because of the
Act's crack/powder discrepancy provides a glaring example of
inequitable sentencing guidelines; 92 however, the experience in
Minnesota generates doubt that this law substantially contributes
to racial disparity in prisons.
In 1991, the Minnesota Supreme Court ruled in State v.
Russell 93 that legislation promulgating unequal sentencing for
disproportionate possession of crack and powder cocaine violated
the state's Equal Protection Clause. 94 At that time, the total
incarceration rate of African Americans in Minnesota was
nineteen times greater than that of White Americans. 95 Today,
more than ten years after the legislation was struck down and
subsequently corrected to offer equal punishment for possession of
equal amounts of crack and powder cocaine, the total incarceration
rate of African Americans is now twenty-seven times greater than
that of White Americans. 96 In the case of Minnesota, curing the
most obviously racist component of the sentencing guidelines
made no visible impact in solving the glaring racial disparity in
the state's prisons.
Although the above statistics suggest that the crack/powder
disparity in sentencing may not necessarily substantially
contribute to racial disparity in prisons, the law's shameless
targeting of African Americans should not be brushed aside. The
endurance of such disparities in state and federal legislation
serves as a distasteful beacon of our indifference to covertly racist
REV., Feb. 5, 1990, at 34 (illustrating that crack and powder cocaine are equally
harmful)).
91. See State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 1991); see also United States v.
King,. 972 F.2d 1259, 1260 (1992) ("The fact that crack cocaine is more addictive,
more dangerous, and can be sold in smaller quantities than powder cocaine is
sufficient reason for Congress to provide harsher penalties for its possession.").
92. These were high profile enough to induce twenty-seven United States
district and circuit court judges to sign a letter addressed to Senator Orrin Hatch,
decrying the ratio. See Judge John S. Martin et al., Rethinking the Crack/Cocaine
Ratio: 1997 Statement on Powder and Crack Cocaine to the Senate and House
Judiciary Committees, 10 FED. SENT. R. 194 (1997).
93. 477 N.W.2d 886, 889 (Minn. 1991).
94. See id. The ratio of ten grams of power cocaine to three grams of crack
cocaine at issue in Russell was not nearly as disproportionate as the 100:1 ratio of
the Anti-Drug Abuse Act.
95. Debra L. Dailey, Prison and Race in Minnesota, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 761,
761 n.4 (1993) (citing Black, White IncarcerationRates, OVERCROWDED TIMES, May
1991, at 6).
96. See JAMIE FELLNER, HUM. RTS. WATCH, PUNISHMENT AND PREJUDICE:
RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE WAR ON DRUGS 9 (May 2000), available at

http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/usa/ (last visited Nov. 28, 2000).
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laws.
By focusing on recidivism, sentencing guidelines play a more
active role in creating racial disparity in prisons. The guidelines
require judges to include a defendant's prior convictions when
calculating the likelihood of recidivism, resulting in more severe
penalties for longer criminal records.9 7 Due to racial profiling,
African Americans are arrested and jailed more frequently than
White Americans.9 8 As prisons become more violent, prisoners are
more likely to commit crimes after release, making it more likely
that they return to prison.9 9 The consequence is that African
Americans are caught in a debilitating cycle, yielding
incarceration rates more than ten percentage points greater than
those of White Americans. 100
This vicious cycle affects not only the persons incarcerated,
When hardened
but also their families and communities.
criminals return to their inner-city homes, they further add to the
"high-crime area" stigma that offers police officers rationalization
for targeting African Americans, which inevitably leads to higher
African-American arrest and prosecution rates. 0 1 By relying on
the length of criminal history as a factor in determining the length
of sentencing, the judicial system targets African Americans
analogously to the way in which law enforcement agencies
consider race when deciding which vehicles to pull over.
In her opinion for the District Court for the District of
Massachusetts, Judge Nancy Gertner combated the inequity
inherent in the sentencing guidelines by refusing to follow them in
a case involving a defendant with a long criminal history composed
mostly of drug trafficking and minor drug violations. 10 2 Judge
97. See Harris, supra note 19, at 304.
98. See supranotes 65-75 and accompanying text99. See Frase, supranote 65, at 37. Christopher Davey observes:
By caging men up like animals and treating them as less than
human, you create rage, and helplessness, and unless there's a
death sentence, or a life sentence, they're going to come out some
day, and they're going to live in the community. They will be a
worse menace to all of us when they come out than when they went
in.
Justin Brooks, How Can We Sleep While the Beds Are Burning? The Tumultuous
Prison Culture of Attica Flourishes in American Prisons Twenty-Five Years Later,
47 SYRAcUSE L. REv. 159, 163 (1996) (quoting Christopher Davey, Prison Solution
Argued; CorrectionsGroup Meeting in City, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Aug. 6, 1995, at
BI).
100. See Dailey, supranote 95, at 766.
101. See United States v. Bell, 86 F.3d 820, 823 (8th Cir. 1996); supra notes 7178 and accompanying text.
102. See United States v. Leviner, 31 F.Supp.2d 23, 24 (D. Mass. 1998).
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Gertner departed from the guidelines not only because the
guidelines did not accurately reflect the minor nature of the crimes
in the defendant's record, but also because their result "mirrors
disparities in the state sentencing, and in particular, racial
disparities."'10 3
Not surprisingly, few judges have followed
Gertner's heroics; however, in a few cases, judges have resigned in
0 4
protest of the guidelines' inequitable results.1
By acting on their disapproval of inequitable sentencing
guidelines, these judges illustrate the need for a change in the law.
Police officers have also voiced similar displeasure with
inequitable enforcement. 0 5 Presently, the United States has
solutions that in theory should adequately combat racial profiling;
however, these solutions are not succeeding in this mission.
III. Ineffective Solutions
At first glance, the United States appears replete with laws
106
that speak directly to racial profiling: the Fourth Amendment
protects citizens against "unreasonable searches and seizures," the
Fifthlo7 and Fourteenth 0 8 Amendments protect citizens from
deprivation of liberty and promise equal protection of the laws,
and the Civil Rights Act of 1964109 provides various remedies for
discrimination. However, Supreme Court rulings have limited,
and in some cases eradicated, these remedies for victims of racial
profiling. 110
A. The Fourth Amendment
Until recently, criminal defendants relied primarily on
Fourth Amendment"' protection when alleging racist law

103. Id. at 33.
104. See Russell, supra note 13, at 728.
105. See Heron Marquez Estrada, Focus of Profiling Shifts from St. Paul;
Minneapolis Officials Say They'll Soon Reveal New Plans For Traffic Stops and
Searches, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, Minn.), June 22, 2001, at B1.
106. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
107. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
108. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
109. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983-2000 (1994).
110. See Phyllis W. Beck & Patricia A. Daly, State Constitutional Analysis of
Pretext Stops: RacialProfiling and Public Policy Concerns, 72 TEMPLE L. REV. 597,
615 (1999) ("FT]he Court has declined to state just what remedy, if any, a criminal
defendant is entitled to if he establishes that he is the victim of racial profiling.").
111. The Fourth Amendment states in pertinent part: 'The right of the people to
be secure ... against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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enforcement. 112
In so doing, they occasionally succeeded in
suppressing evidence obtained as the result of racial profiling.113
Suppression of evidence often leads to acquittal, 1 4 making this
Fourth Amendment defense an extremely powerful one. Evidence
suppression is one of the few substantive checks that the Fourth
Amendment places on the infamous "Terry searches."" 5
Nonetheless, in Whren v. United States, 1 6 the Supreme
Court effectively declared the Fourth Amendment dead with
respect to protecting citizens against racial profiling. In its
decision, the Court held it reasonable for police officers to pull cars
over for nominal traffic violations11 7 with the specific intent to
discover illicit drug use. 118 The result of this decision is that police
officers have the unfettered discretion to stop any car for any
reason, since it is virtually impossible to drive without violating at
least one traffic law." 9
After a police officer stops a vehicle, she is relatively free to
perform a search. 120 Police officers often search vehicles with the
owner's consent. 121 Either out of intimidation, a desire to be
helpful, or ignorance of their right to deny a search, most drivers

112. See Schifferle, supra note 76, at 163.
113. See Abraham Abramovsky & Jonathan I. Edelstein, Pretext Stops and
Racial Profiling After Whren v. United States: The New York and New Jersey
Responses Compared, 63 ALB. L. REV. 725, 729 (2000) ("Until 1996 the means of
[evidence suppression] was clear: to request a hearing at which counsel could
inquire of the arresting officer as to whether his stop was based on particularized
reasonable suspicion or was conducted on a mere pretext.").
114. See Walter, supranote 8, at 292.
115. See Rachel Karen Laser, Unreasonable Suspicion: Relying on Refusals to
Support Terry Stops, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161, 1164 (1995). "Terry searches" allow
police officers to stop and frisk individuals even if they lack consent and probable
cause, as long as they have "articulable suspicion" of possible criminal activity and
the person they are dealing with appears to be armed and dangerous. See Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). It is not necessary that the police officer witness a
criminal act. See Laser, supra,at 1168.
116. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
117. See id. at 810.
118. In such cases, a police officer requires only probable cause that a traffic
violation occurred. See Schifferle, supra note 76, at 167.
119. See David A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of
the FourthAmendment, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 271, 273. Sklansky notes:
Since virtually everyone violates traffic laws at least occasionally, the
upshot of these decisions is that police officers, if they are patient, can
eventually pull over almost anyone they choose, order the driver and all
passengers out of the car, and then ask for permission to search the vehicle
without first making clear the detention is over.
Id.
120. See Harris, supra note 19, at 312-17.
121. See id. at 316.

Law and Inequality

(Vol. 20:53

consent to police searches; 122 however, courts occasionally find a
123
search illegal on the grounds that consent was not freely given.
In the cases where consent is not given or an officer does not
ask for consent, the officer must prove that she had probable cause
to perform the search.124 To successfully establish probable cause,
the police officer need only show "facts and circumstances"
adequate to allow a "reasonable" police officer to believe that a
suspect has committed or is in the process of committing a
crime. 25 By using a "totality-of-the-circumstances" test, police
officers may find probable cause from a suspicious combination of
innocuous activities. 126 Application of a subjective reasonableness
standard and a totality of the circumstances test create
unpredictable probable cause adjudications, subject to the whim of
27
the sitting judge.1
By refusing to consider the subjective intention of the
arresting police officer, the Whren Court severely undercut a
defendant's ability to challenge a pretextual stop under the Fourth
Amendment. 128 However, not all courts have written off the
Fourth Amendment as a viable protection against evidence
obtained by officers during traffic stops based on racial pretexts.
In People v. Dickson,129 a New York trial court held that "[i]t has
never been, and should not now be, the law of our State that we
cannot reject offensive, albeit subjective reasons for police
action."'130 In Dickson, the court suppressed evidence after a police

122. See id.; see also State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 95 (Minn. 1999) (citing a
police officer's statement that ninety-nine percent of passengers consented to his
searches).
123. See, e.g., State v. Dezso, 512 N.W.2d 877, 880-81 (Minn. 1994). In Dezso,
the police officer, upon giving the violator a warning and verifying his license,
found LSD in the violator's wallet. Id. at 879. The Minnesota Supreme Court held
that the suspicious behavior of a traffic violator did not provide probable cause for a
search of the violator's wallet, and since consent was never given, the search
violated the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 880-81. The Minnesota Supreme Court
declared that "[clonsent must be received, not extracted," and that "[flailure to
object [to a request for consent] is not the same as consent." Id. at 880.
124. See Catherine Twitero, The Future of Vehicle Consent Searches in
Minnesota: State v. George, 557 N.W.2d 575, (Minn. 1997), 24 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 1155, 1158 (1997) (citing Dezso, 512 N.W.2d at 880).
125. Sklansky, supra note 119, at 274 n.11 (citing United States v. Watson, 423
U.S. 411 (1976)).
126. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 234, 238 (1983).
127. See Walter, supranote 8, at 270.
128. Whren, 517 U.S. at 813.
129. 690 N.Y.S.2d 390 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998).
130. Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra note 113, at 742-43 (quoting Dickson, 690
N.Y.S.2d at 396).
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officer admitted to a "pretextual motivation" for a traffic stop. 13 1

In a similar case, the Superior Court of New Jersey suppressed
evidence taken from seventeen African Americans because of data
collected by Dr. Lamberth, 132 illustrating disproportionate arrests
of African Americans by the New Jersey state police. 3 3 Despite
the success of these few cases, the Court's decision in Whren
officers in all
significantly relaxed scrutiny against arresting
134
states, even in New York and New Jersey.
In his infinite compassion, Justice Scalia explained that
while the Fourth Amendment is not an appropriate protection
against racial profiling, the Fourteenth Amendment offers a
But the Fourteenth
means for handling such claims. 135
Amendment is not without its own problems: not only does it fail
to provide for evidence suppression, 3 6 but it has its own
discouraging procedural hoops through which plaintiffs must
jump.
B. The FourteenthAmendment
On its face, Fourteenth Amendment 3 7 protection appears
strong and on point: "No state shall... deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."'138 Its purpose is
"at the very least ... directed at governmental racial
discrimination against Blacks."'139 Racial profiling is facially
131. Id. at 743.
132. See State v. Pedro Soto, 734 A.2d 350 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996); see
also Harris, supra note 19, at 277-80 (describing Lamberth's data collection

techniques).
133. See Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra note 113, at 744.
134. See id. at 733-46; see also supra note 119 and accompanying text
(explaining that police have almost unlimited discretion to stop any car for any
reason).
135. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). Scalia explained:
"We of course agree with petitioners that the Constitution prohibits selective
But the
enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race.
constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of laws
is the Equal Protection Clause not the Fourth Amendment." Id; see also United
States v. Pipes, 125 F.3d 638, 640 (1997) C'[]fficers must not selectively enforce
the law based on unconstitutional considerations, but such claims fall under the
Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment.").
136. See infra note 162 and accompanying text.
137. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
138. Id. at § 1. Although there is overlap between Fourteenth and Fifth
Amendment jurisprudence, the Fifth Amendment offers no additional protections
in the context of challenges to racial profiling. Consequently, this Article focuses
exclusively on the Fourteenth amendment. Compare U.S. CONST.amend. XIV with
U.S. CONST.amend. V.
139. GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 628
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discriminatory, and thus violates the spirit and the language of
40
the Fourteenth Amendment.1
Yet the Fourteenth Amendment makes it difficult for a victim
of racial profiling to challenge either the law or law enforcement.
With respect to challenges to legislation, the judiciary need not
consider any discriminatory effects in determining the
constitutionality of a statute; it need only illustrate that the
statute serves a legitimate purpose and that the legislature did
not enact it with racist intent.' 4 ' With respect to challenges to law
enforcement, the plaintiff has the burden of proving a racist
motivation behind traffic stops and searches, despite the fact that
she is in the position with the "least access to the information
necessary to establish a possible invidious purpose."'142 Plaintiffs
claiming that individual police officers violated their rights under
the Equal Protection Clause must prove "purposeful and
intentional acts of discrimination based on their membership in a
43
class, as opposed to discrimination on an individual basis."'
Accomplishing this is often difficult when police officers, in
searching "high-crime" areas, have available the excuse that the
disproportionate number of African-American arrests are due to
the fact that their search was legitimately limited to areas
populated predominantly by African Americans. 144 Moreover,
qualified immunity protects police officers in the reasonable
45
performance of their discretionary duties.
In confronting racial disparity resulting from the
crack/powder distinction, the Fourteenth Amendment once again
proves lifeless. Although the Minnesota Supreme Court in State v.
Russell 146 declared the crack/powder distinction in sentencing
guidelines unconstitutional, it attributed its decision to the
147
additional protection provided by its state constitution.
Unfortunately, most courts have not followed suit, but instead
(13th ed. 1997).
140. Reginald T. Shuford, Any Way You Slice It: Why Racial Profiling Is Wrong,
18 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 371, 375 (1999).
141. See State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 888 n.2 (Minn. 1991) (criticizing the
Supreme Court's decision in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 298 (1987), that a
statute will only be held to violate the Equal Protection Clause if it was enacted
"because" of an anticipated discriminatory effect, not merely "in spite" of such an
effect).
142. Id.
1998).
143. Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 27 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1066 (N.D. Ill.
144. See United States v. Bell, 86 F.3d 820, 823 (8th Cir. 1996).
145. See Chavez, 27 F. Supp. 2d at 1070.
146. 477 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 1991).
147. See id. at 888.
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offer only the minimal protection required by the Fourteenth
Amendment and have consequently upheld the crack/powder
148
disparity in sentencing.
In holding the disparate crack/powder ratio unconstitutional,
the Minnesota Supreme Court studied the realistic application of
the provision, and not simply its theoretical purpose. 149 The
provision lacked the "genuine," "substantial," and "evident"
connection required by Minnesota's Equal Protection Clause to
uphold laws with disparate effects on different social or racial
groups. 150 Virtually all other state and federal courts take the
theoretical approach to analyzing Equal Protection claims. 151 If a
law's purpose can be supported by an unsubstantiated theoretical
argument, such as that crack cocaine is one hundred times more
threatening than powder cocaine, then the Equal152Protection
Clause has no power to combat the resulting disparity.
Even in United States v. Clary,153 the only reported federal
court decision holding that the 100:1 ratio violated the Equal
Protection Clause, 154 the district court focused on the theoretical
nature of the provision instead of its actual results by attempting
55
to prove that its purpose was subconsciously discriminatory.1
Not surprisingly, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned
this decision. 156 In his opinion, Senior Circuit Judge John R.
Gibson asserted that the theory of protection against "unconscious
racism" is untenable because "the Equal Protection Clause is
violated 'only if that impact can be traced to a discriminatory
purpose."" 57
148. See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 19 F.3d 93, 97 (2d Cir. 1994) C'In
reaching this conclusion, we join six other circuits that have similarly held that the
Guidelines' 100 to 1 ratio of powder cocaine to crack cocaine has a rational basis
and does not violate equal protection principles."). Referring to the other four
circuits, the court explained that they "have also rejected equal protection
challenges to the enhanced penalty structure for crack offenses," although not
directly referring to the 100:1 ratio. Id.
149. See Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 889 ('[We have required a reasonable
connection between the actual, and not just the theoretical, effect of the challenged
classification and the statutory goals.").
150. Id. at 888.
151. See Stevens, 19 F.3d at 97.
152. See Richard Dvorak, Cracking the Code: "De-Coding" Colorblind Slurs
During the Congressional Crack Cocaine Debates, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 611, 621

(2000).
153. 846 F. Supp. 768 (E.D. Mo. 1994).
154. See id. at 796.
155. See id. at 773-83.
156. See United States v. Clary, 34 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 1994).
157. Id. at 713 (quoting Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney,
442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979)).
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Unconscious racism is dangerous because of both its
pervasiveness 5 8 and its ability to escape the grasp of the
The Fourteenth Amendment's
Fourteenth Amendment. 159
invidious intent requirement for both lawmakers and police is
impracticable.1 60 As a result, this apocryphal requirement leaves
without remedy those who suffer from disparate impact due to the
16 1
unconscious racism of federal laws.
Not only does the Fourteenth Amendment suffer from the
inability to attack the racist effect of a facially neutral statute, but
it also fails to provide criminal defendants with the ability to have
evidence suppressed. 162 This same weakness affects Title VI of the
1964 Civil Rights Act. 163 Nevertheless, Title VI provides a
stronger basis than the Fourteenth Amendment for combating
racial profiling.
C. Title VI
Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits "discrimination
under federally assisted programs on the ground of race."'164 Since
both state and federal police receive federal funds, 165 racial
profiling by either entity is forbidden. 166 The Supreme Court gave
Title VI a more effective bite than the Fourteenth Amendment by
allowing declaratory and injunctive relief to plaintiffs who
illustrate the existence of a racially disproportionate impact. 167

158. See Sklansky, supra note 119, at 308.
159. See Dvorak, supra note 152, at 615 (asserting that although racism has not
necessarily decreased in the United States, its manifestations have changed in such
a way as to avoid the Fourteenth Amendment's reach).
160. See id. at 621-22.
161. See id. at 618-22.
162. See Walter, supra note 8, at 279-80. In New York and New Jersey, lower
court decisions broke from precedent using an Equal Protection challenge to
suppress evidence collected by a police officer using invalid pretexts. See supra
notes 129-133 and accompanying text; Walter, supra note 8, at 282-83.
163. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994).
164. Id.
165. See Ronald D. Rotunda, The Doctrine of ConditionalPreemption and Other
Limitations on Tenth Amendment Restrictions, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 289, 324 (1984).
166. See INST. ON RACE AND POVERTY, supranote 52, at 14.
167. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 584 n.2 (1983).
Title VI disparate impact analysis requires the plaintiff first to prove that the
facially neutral act in question has a disproportionate effect on a Title VI protected
group. See Elston v. Talladega County Bd.of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1407 (1993). If
the plaintiff succeeds in this and the defendant subsequently illustrates a
substantial legitimate justification for the challenged practice, the plaintiff must
then show a "comparably effective alternative practice which would result in less
disproportionality or that the defendant's proffered justification is a pretext for
discrimination." Id. at 1407.
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Although Title VI comes with its own set of limitations, they
are not as substantively difficult to overcome as those of the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. One limitation is that Title
VI claims can only be brought against entities, not against
Additionally, the federal government must
individuals. 168
consistently fund the program for it to be considered a "federally
169
funded program."'
Despite these limitations, in cases where plaintiffs have
illustrated extreme racial disparity in a police program with
strong evidentiary support, Title VI has been successfully argued
Courts for both the District of
in racial profiling cases. 17 0
Maryland and the Northern District of California declared that
statistical and other evidence indicating racial profiling supports a
Title VI claim for the plaintiffs. 17' These cases, however, merely
Without
recognize the validity of racial profiling claims. 172
adequate evidentiary support, plaintiffs face tough odds against
facially neutral policies. 73 However, in our vast and mostly
impotent arsenal against racial profiling, we have yet more
statutes that address unlawful enforcement activities and patterns
of activities.

168. See Farm Labor Org. Comm. v. Ohio State Highway Patrol, 95 F. Supp. 2d
723, 743 n.13 (2000).
169. See id. at 742-43. An occasional federal grant or conditional federal support
for overtime work does not make a program federally funded. See id.
170. See Brandon Garrett, Standing While Black: Distinguishing Lyons in
Racial Profiling Cases, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1815, 1832 n.66 (2000) (citing
Rodriguez v. Cal. Highway Patrol, 89 F. Supp. 2d 1131, 1139 (N.D. Cal. 2000) and
Md. State Conference of NAACP Branches v. Md. Dep't of State Police, 72 F. Supp.
2d 560, 566-67 (D. Md. 1999)).
171. See Rodriguez, 89 F. Supp. 2d at 1139; Md. State Conference of NAACP
Branches, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 566-67 (D. Md. 1999). In Rodriguez, the Court
recognized the validity of an Equal Protection claim; however, this was because the
plaintiffs alleged discriminatory intent. See Rodriguez, 89 F. Supp. 2d at 1140. It
remains to be seen whether plaintiffs could prove this.
172. See Rodriguez, 89 F. Supp. 2d at 1134-35; Md. State Conference of NAACP
Branches, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 563.
173. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265266 (1977) (stating that absent a clear pattern indicating discriminatory racial
impact, judicial inquiry must be more stringent); see also Garrett, supra note 170,
at 1829-31 (comparing Fourth Amendment Equal Protection Clause and Title VI
claims and explaining that plaintiffs in racial profiling cases generally cannot point
to facially discriminatory statutes).
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D. The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of
1994 and § 1983
1. The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of
1994
Also used sparingly, the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994 (§ 14141), 1 74 considered an injunctive
counterpart 175 to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,176 is Congress's most recent
attempt at providing a legislative solution to various abhorrent
police practices. 177 Ironically, the Act's main objective is to place
100,000 additional police officers on the streets. 178 The Act also
authorizes the Attorney General to investigate and bring suit for
injunctive relief against police departments that employ
79
unconstitutional practices. 1
The language of § 14141, prohibiting "pattern[s] or practice[s]
of conduct by law enforcement officers" that deprive people of their
rights as "secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the
United States,"' 8 0 more specifically addresses racial profiling than
the language in Title VI.181 This language allows for claims not
just against individual officers, but against police departments to
182
compel them to "correct the underlying policy."'
To date, the Department of Justice has used § 14141 only a
few times, successfully resulting in consent decrees entered into by
the defendant police departments. 183 Due to political pressure, the

174. 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (1994).
175. See United States v. City of Columbus, No. CIV.A.2;99CV1097, 2000 WL
1133166, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 3, 2000).
176. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
Section 1983 makes liable any state actor,
including police officers, who "subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws." Id.
177. See Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing StructuralReform Litigation:Deputizing
Private Citizens in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1384, 138587 (2000) (attributing the passage of § 14141 to, among other things, the Los
.Angeles Police Department's practice of performing occasionally fatal chokeholds).
178. See Paul Gottbrath, Feds Have Pursued Cops on Racial Bias Charges,
CINCINNATI POsT, Feb. 27, 2001, at 3A.
179. See Gilles, supra note 177, at 1386.
180. 42 U.S.C. § 14141(a).
181. Title VI generally prohibits "discrimination under federally assisted
programs on the ground of race." Id. § 2000d.
182. United States v. City of Columbus, No. CIV.A2;99CV1097, 2000 WL
1133166, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 3, 2000) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 102-242, at 404
(1991) and explaining that before § 14141, no statute gave authority to sue police
departments for injunctive relief).
183. The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 also contributed
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Act's original citizen lawsuit provision was omitted, thus thrusting
the responsibility of monitoring police practices solely on the
shoulders of the Department of Justice. 184 A large barrier to §
14141's effectiveness lies in its vesting exclusive authority to bring
suit in the Attorney General. 185 While apparently investigating a
number of police departments, the Department of Justice has
brought only three suits since 1995, and many community leaders
have criticized the Department for its ineffectiveness. 186 Former
Attorney General Janet Reno promised a more rigorous
application of the statute by her department, 187 and current
Attorney General John Ashcroft has promised to make racial
profiling cases a priority in his administration. 88 It remains to be
89
seen whether he will keep his promise.1
2.

§ 1983

While § 14141 emerges as the government's primary tool for
prosecuting racial profiling, § 1983190 provides one of the most
common methods for citizens to challenge improper police
misconduct. ' 9
Although the District Court for the Southern District of Ohio
concluded that § 14141 was essentially the injunctive counterpart
of § 1983, and consequently required the same level of proof,192 the
two statutes diverge on several important points. First, any

to the settlements of these cases. 42 U.S.C § 3789d(c) (1994). See United States v.
City of Pittsburgh, No. 97-0354 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 1997) (consent decree entered),
http://www.aclu.org/community/pennsyl/pittcd.html (last visited Nov. 28, 2001);
United States v. City of Steubenville, No. C2-97-966 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 3, 1997)
(consent decree entered), http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/steubensa.htm
(last visited Nov. 28, 2001). The third allegation of a § 14141 violation by the
Department of Justice has not yet reached a conclusion, due to an intervening
question over § 14141's constitutionality. See City of Columbus, 2000 WL 1133166,
at *9 (concluding that § 14141 is constitutional).
184. See Gilles, supranote 177, at 1403.
185. See id. at 1408.
186. See id. at 1407-08.
187. See id. at 1408.
188. See Gottbrath, supra note 178.
189. See John W. Fountain, 300 Rally in St. Louis in Oppositionto Ashcroft, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 15, 2001, at A13 (examining John Ashcroft's suspect record involving
civil rights).
190. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
191. See Kathryn E. Scarborough & Craig Hemmens, Section 1983 Suits Against
Law Enforcement in the Circuit Courts of Appeal, 20 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 1, 6
(1998).
192. See United States v. City of Columbus, No. CIV.A.2;99CV1097, 2000 WL
1133166, at *3, *8 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 3, 2000).
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citizen can raise a § 1983 claim, 193 whereas only the Attorney
General can raise a § 14141 claim. 194 Second, § 1983 is preferable
because it provides for monetary, as opposed to only injunctive,
relief.195 Compared to § 14141, one disadvantage of § 1983 is that
it requires plaintiffs to illustrate racist motivation in proving
196
discriminatory enforcement.
The racist intent requirement of § 1983 mirrors the crippling
specific intent requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment. 197 The
District Court for the Eastern District of New York amplified this
flaw by holding that racial animus was not provable without
evidence of a "similarly situated non-minority group who has been
treated differently" when it considered a case against a police
officer who arbitrarily pulled over the African-American plaintiff
and used racial slurs. 9 8 Consequently, although § 1983 supplies
an adequate forum for victims of tangible offenses, such as
excessive force, false arrest, and illegal search and seizure, 199 its
application has been mostly unsuccessful in attacking less obvious
patterns of offensive police activity. 20 0 Nevertheless, successful §
1983 suits have proved an important way to ensure that police
departments maintain adequate training, hiring, and promoting
practices, while encouraging them to monitor their officers'
201
practices in order to insure against expensive civil remedies.
3.

Resulting Settlements

Recently, § 14141 claims have resulted in settlements which,
at the very least, have placed individual police departments on a
course towards reformation. 2 2 In 1997, the Department of Justice
193. 42 U.S.C § 1983.
194. Id. § 14141(b).
195. Id. § 1983.
196. See Koch v. Rugg, 221 F.3d 1283, 1297-98 (11th Cir. 2000).
197. See supra notes 141-161.
198. Oliver v. Cuttler, 968 F. Supp. 83, 88 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
The same
discriminatory intent requirement is so burdensome that it effectively prevents the
Equal Rights Under the Law Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, from being a strong weapon
against racial profiling. See, e.g., Ferrill v. Parker Group, Inc., 168 F.3d 468 (8th
Cir. 1999); Melendez v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 79 F.3d 661 (7th Cir. 1996) (affirming the
requirement of proof of discriminatory intent to prevail on § 1981 claims).
199. See Scarborough & Hemmens, supra note 191, at 15-16 (explaining that the
majority of § 1983 cases alleged excessive force, false arrest, or illegal search and
seizure, but adding that police policy issues are sometimes litigated).
200. See id. at 13, 18 (stating that approximately twenty-two percent of the
plaintiffs prevail in § 1983 cases).
201. See id.
202. See United States v. City of Pittsburgh, No. 97-0354 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 16,
1997) (consent decree entered), http://www.aclu.org/community/pennsyl/pittcd.html
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entered into a settlement decree with the City of Pittsburgh, the
Pittsburgh Bureau of Police, and the Pittsburgh Department of
Public Safety. The decree ordered the installation of an "early
warning system" database, which would contain "relevant
information about its officers, as well as a statistical model to
identify and modify the behavior of problem officers." 203 This early
warning system requires officers to record, among other things:
the officers' names and badge numbers; citizen complaints against
the officers; details on shootings involving officers; officer
transfers; disciplinary actions against officers; and various civil
and criminal claims against20 4individual officers or against the
police department as a whole.
In addition, the Pittsburgh consent decree requires the city to
develop a recording system that requires an officer, upon every
traffic stop, to record the officer's name and badge number, the
race and gender of the individual stopped, whether the stop led to
a search, what was found in the search, and whether the
individual was arrested. 20 5 This requirement closes a loophole
that previously protected officers when making pretextual stops:
in cases where officers use minor traffic violations to stop vehicles
that fit certain pretextual descriptions, they often issued
20 6
warnings, which rarely involve any record keeping.
E. Data Collection
The most notable settlements with the Department of Justice
the
implementation
of
programs
mandating
include
documentation of all traffic stops.

20 7

Recently, several states have

introduced bills purporting to implement similar programs. Nine
states have passed acts directly addressing racial profiling, most
mandating information collection from law enforcement agencies
at every traffic stop. 208

localities

have

initiated

Additionally, a number of scattered

research

into

their

own

police

(last visited Nov. 28, 2001).
203. Id.
204. See id.
205. See id.
206. See Schifferle, supra note 76, at 178. However, some officers record
incorrect information of the driver's race in order to avoid suspicion of racial
profiling. See Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 27 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1062 (N.D. Ill. 1998)
(showing defendant police officer recorded "White" instead of "Hispanic" on incident
report).
207. See, e.g., supra notes 202-206 and accompanying text.
208. See INST. ON RACE AND POVERTY, supra note 52, at 9-16. The states are
Connecticut, Kansas, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island,
Tennessee, and Washington. Id.
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departments. 20 9
A few acts, such as those promulgated by Oregon, Oklahoma,
"unspecific and largely
considered
and Kansas, 210 are
ineffective." 211 The other states' acts, which contain enforcement
provisions to deter racial profiling and provide useful information
in order to address racial profiling, have their own drawbacks. For
example, the Connecticut and Tennessee acts provide for only a
temporary period in which data is collected. 212 None of these acts
mandate the analysis of the collected data to ensure consistency of
213
recording.
Most of these states have yet to publish their results;
In
consequently, their effectiveness is not yet determined.
response to racial profiling concerns, Michigan's police department
issued a Traffic Enforcement Summary Report on July 20, 2000
covering three months of traffic stops. 2 14 The report illustrated a
significant disparity between the percentage of African Americans
in Michigan (13.8%) and the percentage of African Americans
involved in probable cause searches (23%);215 however, the police
described the report as "inconclusive." 216 St. Paul, Minnesota also
recently released the initial results of its data collection project,
illustrating that of 41,000 drivers stopped, almost 26% were
African American and 56% were White. 217 Considering that only
11.7% of the total population of St. Paul is African American,
African Americans are stopped at more than double the rate one
might expect. 218 Although St. Paul Police Chief William Finney
denied the existence of racial profiling in his department, he
209. See Shaffer & Estrada, supra note 53, at Al (citing the data collection done
in Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minnesota).
210. Kansas's act is the only one to expand data collection to pedestrian stops.
See INST. ON RACE AND POVERTY, supra note 52, at 9.
211. Id. at 14.
212. See id. at 14-15.
213. See id. at 9-16. Such analysis of the collected data is not impractical. A
voluntary police policy that commenced in Sacramento, California on July 1, 2001,
initiated a random telephone survey of two to four percent of the drivers stopped
"to confirm that the information about the stops is correctly recorded on the forms."
Id. at 36.
214. See Lacy, supra note 48, at 2.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Shaffer & Estrada, supra note 53, at Al. The data also indicated that
minority vehicles are searched about twice as often as vehicles driven by
Caucasians. Id.
218. See UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, UNITED STATES DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
PROFILES OF GENERAL DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS 2000: 2000 CENSUS OF
at
available
(2000),
2588
MINNESOTA
AND
HOUSING,
POPULATION

http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2000/dpl/2kh27.pdf (last visited Nov. 28, 2001).
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admitted that six of the city's officers pulled over minorities almost
All six officers were approached about this
exclusively. 219
220
disparity, but only three actually received (minor) punishment.
Data collection efforts not only potentially result in the
punishment of racist police officers, but also provide a catalyst for
important policy changes in police departments. The St. Paul
Police Department, subsequent to its newly released data, has
changed its policies to include a Miranda-type warning that
educates citizens of their right to refuse to grant consent to a
search of their car. 221 In addition, pursuant to an agreement with
community and civil rights groups, the police department will set
up centers for citizens to file complaints in order to make the
222
complaint process more efficient and accessible.
Inconsistencies in data collection acts and programs, as well
as recent studies exhibiting racial disproportion in traffic searches,
suggest the need for a federal law establishing a uniform
framework for each state to build upon in developing their own
The proposed Traffic Stops
mandatory data collection acts.

Statistics Act of

1997223

would have done just this.224 However,

this Act was never passed, because of political pressure and police
outcry. 225 Aside from the reasons barring its passage, the Act
would not necessarily have been effective: it does not provide an
effective enforcement method to ensure honest data collection; it
would not disclose the race of the police officer or the location of
226
the stop; and the evidence collected could not be used at trial.
F. Drug Treatment
Proposed and enacted legislation to reduce drug crime
sentences and shift the emphasis of the War on Drugs from
incarceration to treatment also exists in some states. 227 Such
legislation essentially supplies a back-end solution to racial
profiling, from which a high proportion of African-American drug

219. See Shaffer & Estrada, supra note 53,
220. Their punishment was reassignment.
221. See Estrada, supra note 105, at B1.
222. See id.
223. H.R. 118, 105th Cong. (1997).
224. See Trende, supra note 54, at 341.
225. See id.
226. See id. at 377-78.
227. See Thomas, supra note 16, at Al
Arizona as states with strong citizen
incarceration).

at Al.
See id.

(listing Washington, California, and
endorsement for treatment over
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convicts benefit. 228 A forerunner to these laws, the ten-year-old
Brooklyn Drug Treatment Alternatives-to-Prison (D-TAP) program
allows nonviolent drug offenders to enter a treatment program
instead of incarceration. 229 Although some of D-TAP's facilities list
a one-third drop-out rate, ninety-two percent of its graduates go on
The program's
to find jobs and lead productive lives. 230
progressiveness and success are clouded by its selectiveness, 231 a
malady to which the facilitators of the program attribute most of
its success. 232 Nonetheless, studies from the Rand Corporation
and the National Institute of Drug Abuse have concluded that
treatment is generally a more efficient and effective way to handle
the drug use problem than incarceration. 233 It follows that DTAP's success can be repeated in more expansive drug treatment
programs around the country.
Although solutions to racial profiling are slowly emerging,
they lack the necessary range to adequately address racial
disparity in prisons. Programs, such as data collection, that
scrutinize disproportionate arrest rates to combat racial profiling
at the front end are certainly necessary to sufficiently reduce
racial disparity in prisons. However, legislation creating programs
such as diversionary drug treatment programs must be enacted as
a remedy at the back end of racial profiling, after the victims'
arrests, in order to address the vicious cycle of incarceration that
results from living in a community constantly targeted by the
police.
IV. Fighting the Vicious Cycle
By passing an assortment of civil rights legislation designed
to attack laws and actions which evince overt racism, the United
States has attempted to combat Gunnar Myrdal's "vicious
circle." 234 Yet the vicious cycle of cumulative causation still exists,
as evidenced by the disparate representation of African Americans

228. Because most inmates incarcerated for drug use are African American, they
as a group stand to benefit the most from drug treatment legislation. See supra
note 15-18 and accompanying text.
229. See Dunne, supra note 79, at World News 8.
230. See id.
231. See id. (stating that after a decade of the program's existence, it has
accepted only 1174 people, while 11,000 people were arrested for drug crimes in
1999 alone).
232. See id.
233. See Steven B. Duke, Drug Prohibition:An UnnaturalDisaster,27 CoNN. L.
REV. 571, 588 (1995).
234. See MYRDAL, supra note 31, at 75.
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in our prison system. This suggests that the passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, while partially succeeding in addressing overt
racism, has done little, if anything, to combat the covert prejudice
that exists in law enforcement procedures and the War on
235
Drugs.
The vicious cycle also manifests itself in the microcosm of our
prisons. Today, nearly one-fourth of the prison population consists
of nonviolent drug offenders. 236 Notwithstanding the fact that
violent criminals make up over fifty percent of the nation's prison
population, 237 the imprisonment rate of new, nonviolent drug
offenders is continually rising. 238 Many of the offenders are drug
addicts or minor actors in the drug trade who, because of
sentencing guidelines, must serve a minimum incarceration
time. 239

Instead of receiving the necessary treatment, these

addicts remain exposed to drugs, are subjected to deleterious
240
prison conditions, and consequently become even more violent.
The increasing prison population gives rise to violence in prisons,
resulting in increasingly violent prisoners who commit more
violent crimes upon release. 241 Moreover, upon release many
inmates return to the inner city, giving apparent justification to
the negative stereotypes of such communities. Police officers thus
have a rationale for targeting minorities in "high-crime areas,"
threatened
minority
innocent,
an
thereby
victimizing
population. 242 The end result is an increased prison population,
resulting substantially from drug laws and law enforcement
policies that target African Americans, made more violent through
adverse prison conditions. 243 The drug laws, law enforcement
policies, and sentencing guidelines target African Americans and
thereby contribute not only to the rising prison population, but
also to the increased racial imbalance within that population.

235. See supra Part II.B-C.
236. See Bill Kaufnann, Stop Fabricating War, THE CALGARY SUN, Aug. 21,
2000, at 11. These figures are supported by Fellner's report, supra note 96, at 2.

237.
238.
239.
240.

See Butterfield, supra note 68, at A14.
See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
See Hearing,supra note 37, at 149.
See Andrew H. Malcolm, Explosive Drug Use Creating New Underworld in

Prisons,N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 30, 1989, at Al; see also supra note 99 and accompanying

text (describing the debilitating nature of prisons). An estimated 75% of state
prison inmates are in need of drug treatment, while only an estimated 20% receive
it. Steven Belenko, The Challenges of Integrating Drug Treatment Into the
Criminal Justice Process,63 ALB. L. REV. 833, 838 (2000).

241. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 71-79 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
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In order to reverse the cycle and combat racial disparity in
prisons, the United States must address many factors that support
and result in unconscious racism. As blatant racism faded with
the advent of civil rights legislation, unconscious racism will
similarly diminish with the revamping of legislation, its
enforcement, and the criminal justice system in general.
A.

Current Remedies for Racial ProfilingAre Insufficient

Racial profiling is not a new phenomenon, 244 but it has only
recently gained notoriety in the United States. 245 This newly
exposed problem has escaped the outdated protections of the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. 246 By holding that Fourth
Amendment analysis shall not include the officer's subjective
intentions, 247 the Supreme Court made it possible for a racist
officer to justify pulling over only African Americans by showing
that he had the modicum of reasonableness necessary for probable
cause 248 or, in cases of a Terry search, mere "articulable
suspicion." 249 As the political tide continues to ebb away from
strong constitutional protections and towards harsher law
enforcement, probable cause and articulable suspicion become
easier for defendant police officers to prove, 250 leaving the Fourth
Amendment virtually useless to address racial profiling.
Unlike the Fourth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment
provides protection for victims of racial profiling if such victims
can prove that the arresting officer was motivated by racial
animus when stopping the vehicle. 25 1 However, without the
officer's (extremely uncommon) confession that the proffered
reason for the stop was a mere pretext, 252 the Fourteenth
Amendment requires too high a burden of proof for plaintiffs to
overcome. Furthermore, even if a plaintiff has a strong prima
facie case for racial profiling, the majority of courts in the United

244. See Mark Rosenbaum & Daniel P. Tokaji, Healing the Blind Goddess: Race
and CriminalJustice, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1941, 1950 n.39 (2000) (citing Yancey Roy,
Recent Cases Put Racial Profiling in Spotlight, GANNETT NEWS SERV., Feb. 28,
2000, at ARC).
245. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
246. See supra Part III.A-B.
247. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
248. See supra notes 124-125 and accompanying text.
249. See supra note 115.
250. See Walter, supra note 8, at 270.
251. See supra notes 142-145 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 158161 and accompanying text (criticizing the intent requirement).
252. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
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States do not allow evidence suppression on account of
253
discriminatory law enforcement.
Title VI's language provides a potential avenue for reform of
enforcement practice: even if a police department can show a
legitimate justification for the challenged practice, the plaintiffs
25 4
can still succeed by illustrating a viable alternative practice.
Such an alternative practice could be a program that closely
their
monitors the defendant police officers in order to reform
255
practices, thus achieving the original goal of the lawsuit.
Additionally, the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994 (§ 14141) has resulted in a few
settlements, 256 but those settlements are infrequent due to
citizens' lack of access to § 14141 and the Department of Justice's
As evidenced by the lack of
lackadaisical investigations. 257
successful challenges to racial profiling, Title VI and § 14141 have
also proven insufficient to address the problem of racial profiling.
B. Solutions
The laws and policies currently in place are no match for the
pestilence that is racial profiling. To further a favorable course in
combating racial profiling and the consequent racial disparity in
prisons, legislators must go beyond what has already been
proposed. To properly address this epidemic, a federal data
collection law that bans racial profiling must be enacted, as must
reforms in sentencing policy.
1. A Federal Data Collection Act Must Be Enacted
Some of the most important provisions contained in the
Department of Justice settlements are those mandating data
Compulsory data collection
collection by police agencies. 258
accomplishes a number of things. It serves as a useful tool in
deterring officers from using race as a pretext in traffic stops.
Especially in cases of officers with propensities to arrest mostly
253. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
254. See cases cited supra note 167 and accompanying text.
255. See, e.g., supra notes 202-206 and accompanying text (describing the
Pittsburgh consent decree, which, although centered around the Violent Crime
Control Act of 1994, also included Title VI claims, resulting in police department
policy change); see also supra notes 221-222 and accompanying text (describing a
significant change in the St. Paul Police Department's policy, resulting not from
Title VI litigation, but from a panel discussing Title VI issues).
256. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
257. See supra notes 185-186 and accompanying text.
258. See supra Part III.E.
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minorities, compulsory data collection can isolate an officer for
proper disciplinary procedures and additional training. 259 Data
collection also aids plaintiffs in future litigation. 260 With strong
statistical proof provided by the law enforcement agencies
themselves, victims of racial profiling have prima facie proof of
civil rights violations.
However, compulsory data collection is vulnerable to
inaccurate collection by the police officers. 26 Regardless of the
new data collection acts, bills, and consent decrees, inconsistencies
are inevitable because police departments oversee their own
collection. Consequently, police departments will have the
incentive to provide skewed reports to avoid incriminating
themselves. 262 Data collection acts can avoid this pitfall if the
Department of Justice scrutinizes random parcels of the collected
data for inconsistencies, imposing harsh penalties on officers who
record incorrect data.
The Lamberth studies are significant not only because they
shed light on the seriousness of the problem of racial profiling, but
also because they present a report that is not tainted by
governmental bias. 263 The results were staggering enough to
convince a judge to suppress evidence that would have convicted
seventeen African-American men. 264 While significant because
they demonstrate at least some formidibility of civil rights
legislation, the Department of Justice settlements have thus far
resulted only in anti-racist protocol and compulsory data collection
that should be firmly in place in all municipalities. The data
collection, while essential, only exposes poor department training.
The resulting police department reforms are more important and
more difficult to judge than the data.
In addition, not all of the data collection attempts are
Connecticut and Tennessee's data collection acts
effective.
mandate only temporary programs. 265 Not only does a temporary
259. See, e.g., supra notes 219-220 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 132-133 and accompanying text.
261. See supra note 206.
262. See Harris, supra note 19, at 276 ('It may also be because records
concerning police conduct are either irregular or nonexistent. But it may also be
because there is active hostility in the law enforcement community to the idea of
keeping comprehensive records of traffic stops.").
263. Of course, not all police departments have a desire to hide potential
practices of racial profiling. In fact, some departments have conducted their own
data collection in order to isolate and address the potential problem of racial
profiling. See Harris, supra note 19, at 322.
264. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
265. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
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program undermine the accuracy of the data, but it also
undermines the whole point of the program, which is to isolate and
permanently reform racist police programs. Data collection should
be a first step in combating racial profiling, 266 not a lone,
temporary stab.
Due to these flaws in state data collection acts as well as the
sluggish pace that some states have taken in setting up adequate
data collection programs, 267 the federal government needs to pass
a law establishing a standardized base from which each state must
develop its own data collection act. The proposed Traffic Stops Act
of 1997268 provides a strong framework for such a law. In order to
properly describe an arrest, the statute ideally would mandate the
recording of all relevant elements. 269 In addition, the collected
data must be strictly screened for inconsistencies, 270 and the
evidence acquired must be admissible in court. Furthermore, this
data must be analyzed by uninterested parties for patterns
indicating racial bias in law enforcement.
Such an act, however, faces the same mountain of political
27 1
obstacles that kept the Traffic Stops Act from being passed.
Opponents clamor that a federal data collection act will deter
police officers from adequately doing their jobs if they feel that
they are being scrutinized. 27 2 However, it hardly seems just to
become tougher on crime, yet remain complacent with those who
enforce the laws. Added scrutiny will lead to a more lawful police
force, just as stricter law enforcement should lead to more lawful
citizens. Moreover, having better-educated and more thoroughly
scrutinized police officers helps assuage the distrust that many
266. See Harris, supra note 19, at 320.
267. See supra notes 208-209 and accompanying text.
268. H.R. 118, 105th Cong. (1997).
269. The record should include the race of the arresting officer and the location
of the arrest. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
270. See, e.g, Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 27 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1062 (1998).
Plaintiff Chavez, a Mexican private investigator, drove down Interstate 80, not
violating any traffic laws, but presenting a suspicious profile by driving a rental car
with out-of-state license plates, open maps, fast food wrappers in the front seat,
and a gym bag in the back seat. See id. The defendant police officer recorded
"White" instead of "Hispanic" on incident report. See id. See also supra note 213
and accompanying text (describing a police program involving telephone follow-ups
to stopped drivers to ensure that the officer involved recorded the racial
information accurately).
271. See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
272. See Steve Miller, 'Profile'Directive Rallies Two Sides; Bush Seeks Data on
Police Stops, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2001, at Al (citing Robert Scully, executive
director of the National Association of Police Organizations, who claimed that not
only would the mandatory data collection lead to more administrative work and
less police work).
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A
inner-city inhabitants have towards law enforcement. 273
Federal Traffic Stops Act may one day be a reality. As dialogue
opens between the community and the police department,
solutions in the form of data collection seem a logical first step.
A major value of data collection is its use in lawsuits. Thus
far, most courts have been unwilling to allow statistical evidence
274
without additional evidence indicative of invidious intent;
however, statistical evidence is slowly gaining acceptance in Title
VI adjudication. 275 After taking steps to ensure the accuracy of
data collection methods, a federal act mandating data collection
must be passed. The data collected, however, must be useful
pursuant to federal law.
2.

Federal Law Banning Racial Profiling Must Be Enacted

Lawsuits are important in combating racial profiling because
they point out the weaknesses in police programs. 27 6 In turn,
identification of these weaknesses can help facilitate police
training programs, recruiting programs, and use of policy
manuals. In order to maintain adequate and productive lawsuits
attacking racial profiling, a federal law specific to racial profiling
needs to be passed. Section 14141 falls short of providing an
adequate remedy for racial profiling because it does not allow for
citizen suits. 277 A federal law banning racial profiling is important
and necessary, not only as a remedy for racial profiling victims,
but also as official recognition of this national problem. Possibly
one reason for the dearth of successful suits is the historical
obscurity of racial profiling. By affirmatively addressing the issue
with a law that is specific to racial profiling, litigation will be more
effective, thereby preventing the issue from sinking back into
obscurity.
This act would best work in conjunction with a compulsory
data collection act. Observing the totality of the circumstances
through the collected data, citizen groups could effectively

273. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
274. See Schifferle, supra note 76, at 171. But see United States v. Jennings, No.
91-5942, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 926, at *12 (6th Cir. Jan 13, 1993) (allowing
statistical evidence to show that an Equal Protection violation has occurred).
275. See Md. State Conference of NAACP Branches v. Md. Dep't of State Police,
72 F. Supp. 2d 560, 566 (D. Md. 1999) ("While [statistical evidence] is not
dispositive on the issue of discrimination, it is relevant evidence that minority
motorists were treated differently from [Whites, at least for a period of time on a
portion of 1-95.").
276. See Scarborough & Hemmens, supra note 191, at 4.
277. See supra notes 184-185 and accompanying text.
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scrutinize the practices and procedures of entire police
departments and individual police officers alike.
One concern of such legislation may be that it would open the
floodgates to civil rights litigation;27 8 however, the paltry three
consent decrees secured by the Department of Justice in the past
five years illustrate the need for citizens to be involved in raising
racial profiling suits. The Senate proposed such an act, which
focused on "enforcing the racial profiling ban," but disallowed
recovery of monetary damages. 279 Disallowing monetary damages
provides barriers against frivolous lawsuits. However, in order for
the act to be successful, it needs to permit evidence suppression
and disciplinary actions against police officers and/or police
departments. At present, there are not enough sticks to prod
police departments into sufficient introspection. A statute that
holds police departments accountable will ultimately improve the
relationship between the officers and citizens by improving the
280
integrity of the department.
Nonetheless, the advent of a law specific to racial profiling
will be interpreted by the same legal system that provides officers
with the tools to stop and search any vehicle they choose.
Although preventing the criminal justice system from targeting
African Americans as an initial step is necessary, it is also
necessary to address this problem from the back end, after arrest.
3.

Sentencing Guidelines Must Be Reformed

Sentencing guidelines were offered as a back-end solution to
prejudice in the criminal justice system. 281 However, in practice,
they have served more as a mechanism that clandestinely adds to
racial prejudice. 282 Because African Americans are arrested
disproportionately more than White Americans, they have a
higher rate of recidivism, for which they are forced to serve longer
This contributes to a vicious cycle, further
sentences. 283
neighborhoods as "high-crime areas" and
minority
stigmatizing
resulting in the prosecution of a disproportionate number of
African Americans.

278. This was Congress's reason for not allowing citizen suits in § 14141. See
Gilles, supra note 177, at 1403.
279. Tom Brune, Profiling Proposal Attacked; Senate Bill Called Wrong
Approach',NEWSDAY (Long Island, N.Y.), Aug. 2, 2001, at News A16.
280. See id.
281. See 18 U.S.S.G. Ch. 1, Pt.A, intro, comment. (1996).
282. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
283. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
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Yet, the system is based on an equitable theory. 284 One of the
founding purposes of sentencing guidelines is to combat unfair
judicial discretion.2 85 Sentencing guidelines allow judges to dole
out sentences efficiently, while limiting the scope of potentially
racist judges' discretionary decisions.2 8 6 In an ideal criminal
justice system that does not disproportionately punish minorities,
sentencing guidelines as they presently stand might succeed.
However, given the existence of discriminatory drug laws and law
enforcement, reforming the guidelines is necessary to attack both
the rising prison population and its accompanying racial
287
disparity.
Sentencing guidelines, in theory, offer a practical solution to
inequities stemming from judicial discretion. The problem lies in
some of the elements on which they focus. The courts should use
the fact that a police officer was patrolling a "high-crime" area as
an element to mitigate a criminal's sentence, and they should
discontinue their strict application of harsher sentencing for
repeat offenders of nonviolent crime. Judge Gertner's departure
from the sentencing guidelines is a lone ship sailing on a judicial
sea that churns with intense political pressure to be harsh on
crime. Her heroics should not have to be considered so heroic.
should mandate
In addition, sentencing guidelines
alternative sentencing, such as drug treatment in cases of
nonviolent drug offenses. The combined effect of the War on
Drugs, law enforcement's patrolling "high-crime" areas, and
sentencing guidelines that focus on recidivism is turning petty
drug offenders into violent criminals. Moreover, the War on Drugs
has substantially contributed to the unnecessarily dramatic
increase in our country's prison population. 288 The fact that the
Sentencing Reform Act was passed in the midst of the prison boom
fostered partly by the War on Drugs lends support to the
conclusion that the guidelines were enacted as a response to the
increasing number of prisoners. 288 Accordingly, the sentencing
284. See Frase, supra note 65, at 3.
285. See Letter front William W. Wilkins, Jr., Chair, Committee on Criminal
Law, to Judge Diana E. Murphy, Chair, United States Sentencing Commission
(Mar. 10, 2000), 12 FED. SENT. R. 144 (1999) (citing S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 52
(1983)).
286. See Frase, supra note 65, at 3.
287. See Hearing, supra note 37, at 148 (promoting drug crime sentencing
reform as the priority in combating racial disparity in prisons).
288. See supra notes 6, 69 and accompanying text. In addition, the money spent
on incarceration could be more efficiently spent on drug treatment. See supra note
233 and accompanying text.
289. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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guidelines are a reaction to the War on Drugs both in the necessity
to judiciously handle the huge number of drug convicts and the
public's desire to "lay the smack down" on drug crime. 290 People
living in "high-crime areas" may benefit from increased
patrolling, 29 1 but they do not benefit from this vicious cycle, which
seizes its citizens and, instead of reforming them, turns them into
more dangerous criminals.
By providing alternative sentencing for nonviolent drug
offenders, the public can wage its War on Drugs, but remove the
people from the carnage. Our country must end its War on Blacks.
In general, judges should be allowed to depart from prescribed
sentences if any evidence demonstrates that the conviction was the
Enforcement policies need to be
result of racial profiling.
overhauled, but this cannot happen without a struggle, not only
within the police departments, but throughout our unconsciously
racist society. This unconscious racism buoys racial profiling and
provides police departments with the impossible task of being hard
By pushing
on crime without being hard on minorities.
enforcement out of the inner cities, innocent people will lose
protection. Consequently, the United States needs laws that
isolate racial profiling and treat, instead of incarcerate, drug
criminals. If lawmakers respond to this unconscious racism by
providing sentencing departures for nonviolent drug criminals and
victims of racial profiling, racial disparity in prisons will receive
necessary back-end help to reverse the cycle.
Conclusion
The election of President George W. Bush reflects an ongoing
desire among U.S. citizens to be hard on crime. 292 We see the
prison population increasing, and instead of questioning the
validity of the process, we ask for harsher laws and more prisons.
As our crime enforcement intensifies, the issues of racial profiling
and racial disparity in prisons bubble to the surface of political
discourse. At long last, laws are creeping into this country that
purport to address the realistic, instead of theoretical, aspects of
these problems. However, present solutions fall short. As the
prison population becomes more racially unbalanced, laws must
lead to drastic reformation of our criminal justice system, both on
the front end-in police enforcement-and on the back end-in
290. See supra notes 84, 86 and accompanying text.
291. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
292. Under Bush's reign as governor, Texas led the nation in prison expansion.
See Butterfield, supra note 68, at A10.
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sentencing-in order to help reverse the cycle. Our enormous
prison population not only serves as a testament to our country's
intolerance of crime; it also provides painful proof that we are still
a racist nation.

